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I. INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota law prohibits the city of Minneapolis from 
extending employment benefits to the domestic partners of city 
workers.1  Nevertheless, on December 13, 2002 the Minneapolis 
City Council approved by an 8-4 vote a measure requiring large 
contractors with the city to provide benefits to their employees’ 
domestic partners.2  As a result, Minneapolis now requires city 
contractors to provide benefits that the city itself cannot legally 
provide.3  The question is, does a Minnesota city have the authority 
under state law4 to mandate that contracting employers provide 
 
 1. David Hawley, Minneapolis Approves Domestic Partner Provision, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS, Dec. 14, 2002, at 5B, available at 2002 WL 104725048. 
 2. See Rochelle Olson, Minneapolis City Council; Rule on Domestic Partner 
Benefits OK’d; Many Firms That Have Contracts with the City of Minneapolis Will Have to 
Comply, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 14, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WL 
5388600. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Although intriguing federal issues are raised by the Minneapolis domestic 
partner-city contractor ordinance, this comment does not address them.  For the 
purposes of this comment, it suffices to observe that the ordinance raises issues as 
to whether it is preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., or violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Both issues have been 
litigated extensively in California.  See S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. San Francisco, 336 F.3d 
1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding San Francisco’s domestic partner-city 
contractor ordinance on the grounds that it does not conflict with the state’s 
domestic partner benefits registration statute); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. San 
Francisco, 266 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001); S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. San Francisco, 253 
F.3d 461, 470-71, 474 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding San Francisco’s domestic partner-
city contractor ordinance did not directly violate the Commerce Clause and did 
not violate the California Constitution); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. San Francisco, 
992 F. Supp. 1149, 1165, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding San Francisco’s domestic-
partner-city contractor ordinance did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
“as an excessive burden on interstate commerce[,]”  but is preempted by ERISA to 
the extent its mandated benefits are “covered by ERISA and provided through 
ERISA plans”). 
  Numerous commentaries have already been offered on these subjects as 
well.  See generally Jeffrey A. Brauch, Municipal Activism v. Federal Law: Why ERISA 
Preempts San Francisco-Style Domestic Partner Ordinances, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 925 
(1998); William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review 
and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001); Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption of 
State and Local Laws on Domestic Partnership and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in 
Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 267 (1998); Todd Foreman, Comment, 
Nondiscrimination Ordinance 101 San Francisco’s Nondiscrimination in City Contracts 
2
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domestic partner benefits?5 
Part II of this comment traces the recent evolution in 
municipal domestic partner benefits legislation nationwide.6  After 
comparing the various domestic partner-contractor ordinances in 
San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis,7 Part III 
surveys the history and status of “home rule” authority with a focus 
on Minnesota law.8  Parts IV, V, and VI then analyze whether 
Minneapolis’ recent domestic partner benefits scheme is consistent 
with Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,9 in which the court held that 
Minneapolis exceeded its “home rule” authority by providing 
domestic partners benefits to city employees.10 Part VI also ponders 
whether Lilly was properly decided.11  Part VII explores new state 
issues raised by Minneapolis’ domestic partner ordinance.12  This 
comment concludes that Lilly employed the correct interpretation 
of “home rule” authority in Minnesota and the decision renders 
Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits law invalid.13 
 
and Benefits Ordinance: A New Approach to Winning Domestic Partnership Benefits, 2 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 319 (1999); Emily V. Griffen, Comment, “Relations Stop 
Nowhere”: ERISA Preemption of San Francisco’s Domestic Partner Ordinance, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 459 (2001); Richard W. Helms, Note, Air Transport Association of America v. City 
and County of San Francisco: Domestic Partner Benefits Upheld, Except Where Preempted by 
ERISA, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 323 (1999-2000); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Domestic 
Partnership and ERISA Preemption, 76 TUL. L. REV. 373 (2001); Mark A. Tumeo, Civil 
Rights for Gays and Lesbians and Domestic Partner Benefits: How Far Could an Ohio 
Municipality Go?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165 (2002-03); Alex Turner, The Denial of 
Benefits to the Same-sex Domestic Partners of State Employees: How Do Claims of 
Discrimination Fare Outside the Shadow of ERISA Preemption?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
669 (2002).  This is not to imply these federal issues are settled, however. 
 5. The question of the legality of city ordinances requiring contractors to 
provide benefits to unmarried domestic partners is “on the cutting edge of law and 
has a number of sub-parts.  The answers are only partially in view at this time 
because there has been little litigation on the issue.”  Jordan Lorence, Corporate 
Resource Council, Answers to an Employer’s Legal Questions About Domestic Partner 
Benefits and Sexual Orientation Nondiscrimination Policies, at 2, available at 
http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white_papers/Legal_Questions.pdf 
(last visited March 6, 2004). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 10. Id. at 113; see infra Parts IV-VI.B. 
 11. See infra Part VI.C. 
 12. See infra Part VII. 
 13. See infra Part VIII. 
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II. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF 
MUNICIPAL DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS LEGISLATION 
A.  History of Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation in the United 
States 
Minneapolis has been at the forefront of the movement to 
recognize domestic partners since 1991.14  Minneapolis was neither 
the first nor the only city to enact domestic partner ordinances, 
however.15  Thus it is helpful to understand the meaning and 
origins of the term “domestic partner” in order to understand the 
goals and context of Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits 
legislation. 
The term “domestic partner” is a fairly recent innovation in 
the English language, going back only about twenty years.16  The 
meaning of the term is less clear than its origins, however.  The 
definition of “domestic partner” remains “an empty vessel that 
legislatures or employers may fill as they wish.”17  If a generally 
accepted definition of a “domestic partner” does exist, it is 
someone who lives together with another partner, is at least 
eighteen years old, is not married, is jointly responsible for 
expenses, is not a close relative, and is competent to consent to the 
arrangement.18  Although “domestic partner” is often coterminous 
with same-sex partner, a vast majority of jurisdictions define a 
“domestic partner” as someone of either the same or opposite sex 
as the other partner.19 
Domestic partner benefits legislation soon followed the 
 
 14. See Steve Brandt, City to Recognize Incoming Domestic Partners, MINNEAPOLIS 
STAR TRIB., Sept. 5, 2003, at 2B, available at 2003 WL 5543173.  “Minneapolis was 
the second large city in the nation [after San Francisco] to allow domestic partners 
to register when it adopted its law in 1991.”  Id.  Minneapolis is also among the 
first large cities to recognize domestic partners registered in other cities.  Id.  The 
city currently has three homosexuals on its city council.  Id.  This is not to imply 
that the issue of domestic partner benefits only impacts homosexuals, however. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See Sherman, supra note 4, at 382-83.  The New York Times did not use the 
term “domestic partner” until 1982.  Id. at 382. 
 17. Id. at 383.  Contrast “domestic partner” with the term “widow,” which has 
a meaning that all states presumably agree upon.  Id. This definitional ambiguity 
may be the result of the fairly recent introduction of the term.  See id. at 383-83. 
 18. Duncan, supra note 4, at 969-72. 
 19. Id. at 972.  Montgomery County, Maryland and Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania are two jurisdictions that “allow only same-sex couples to register.”  
Id. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/4
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:01 PM 
2004] PULLING THE LILLY FROM THE POND? 935 
development of the term.  Berkeley, California birthed the 
municipal domestic partner benefit in 1984.20  A number of cities in 
recent years have since enacted ordinances providing employment 
benefits to domestic partners of city employees.21  As many as 
seventy-four cities and counties currently offer their employees or 
residents domestic partner benefits.22  Some of these measures 
provide domestic partner benefits only to same-sex partners of 
employees, while others encompass both same and opposite-sex 
partners.23  Minneapolis joined the fray by enacting its first 
domestic partner ordinance providing benefits to city employees in 
1991,24 though this legislation was later struck down.25 
B.  “A Tale of Four Cities”: Domestic Partner Legislation Affecting City 
Contractors 
While legislation providing benefits to city employees’ 
domestic partners has become more common,26 some cities have 
not stopped at providing such benefits to their own employees.  
Recently, four large cities have gone a step further by enacting 
ordinances mandating that city contractors, rather than city 
governments, provide domestic partner benefits to their own 
employees.27  These cities are San Francisco,28 Los Angeles,29 
Seattle,30 and (most recently) Minneapolis.31  Rather than provide 
 
 20. Id. at 965. 
 21. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Validity of Governmental Domestic 
Partnership Enactment, 74 A.L.R.5th 439, § 2 (1999). 
 22. Duncan, supra note 4, at 965. 
 23. Miller, supra note 21, at § 2. 
 24. Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 539, 539 (1991); see also Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and Discrimination: 
The Need for Fair Employment Compensation, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 329, 329 
(1992). 
 25. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 26. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 964-65. 
 27. See Dean Scott, Companies Take Lead in Extending Benefits to Unmarried 
Partners, KIPLINGER BUSINESS FORECASTS, July 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
10080583. 
 28. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.1-6 (2002), available at 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/government_index.asp#codes (last visited March 6, 
2004). 
 29. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, art. 1, § 10.8.1-2 (2002), available at 
http://lacodes.lacity.org/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm (last 
visited March 6, 2004). 
 30. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010-050 (2002), 
available at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/council/legdb.htm (last visited March 6, 
2004). 
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benefits to city employees, these cities require contractors who bid 
on city contracts to offer domestic partner benefits to their 
workers.32  San Francisco was the first city to enact such legislation, 
which took effect in 1997.33  Seattle and Los Angeles soon followed 
suit with their own ordinances.34  As was the case with domestic 
partner benefits legislation aimed at city employees, Minneapolis 
followed San Francisco’s lead with its own city contractor ordinance 
as well.35 
1.  Similarities among City Contractor Ordinances 
The four cities’ ordinances share many basic similarities.  The 
crux of each ordinance is that city contractors must offer the same 
benefits to their workers’ domestic partners as they do to workers’ 
spouses.36  Each city includes in its definition of domestic partner 
persons registered as domestic partners with the city, and none of 
the statutes limits the definition to same-sex couples.37  Exceptions 
to compliance are provided in each ordinance, which are generally 
given at the discretion of the city under certain limited 
conditions.38  Under these exceptions, a city contractor may be 
granted an exception to compliance if the city faces an 
emergency,39 the contractor is the only provider of services the city 
 
 31. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003), 
available at http://livepublish.municode.com/13/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-
j.htm (last visited March 6, 2004). 
 32. Scott, supra note 27. 
 33. See Sherman, supra note 4, at 378-79. 
 34. See id. at 378, n.13 (citing J. Martin McOmber, Benefits for Gay Couples 
Approved by City Council, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at B3, available at 1999 WL 
6300935; Rick Orlov, Domestic Partner Benefits at Issue; City Panel Wants Contractors 
Forced to Offer Care, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 1999, at N3, available at 1999 WL 
7031585). 
 35. See MINNEAPOLIS CODE tit. 2, ch. 18 (2003). 
 36. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2 (2002); MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) (2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. 
CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.1(b) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 
20.45.020A 2002). 
 37. See L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(b)(8) (2002); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003); S.F., 
CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.1(c) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, 
ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.E (2002). 
 38. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i) (2002); MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g) (2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. 
CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1; SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 
20.45.020.C (2002). 
 39. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(c) (2002); 
6
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requires,40 or the contractor is a public entity.41  Each city, save 
Seattle, also allows exceptions to contractor compliance if the 
exceptions are in the perceived best interest of the city.42  All four 
cities include provisions indicating that the ordinances are to be 
interpreted consistently with federal and state law.43  Finally, each 
ordinance is severable44 in the event that any parts are modified or 
stricken in court.45 
2.  Differences among City Contractor Ordinances 
Despite sharing many similarities, the four cities’ ordinances 
contain a few noteworthy differences.  Whereas Minneapolis and 
San Francisco require compliance by subcontractors as well as 
contractors, Los Angeles and Seattle do not.46  While no city 
 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(1) (2003); 
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(2) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. 
CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.1 (2002). 
 40. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, §§ 10.8.2.l(i)(1)(a), (g) (2002); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(2)(c)-(e) 
(2003); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(1) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., 
MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.2 (2002). 
 41. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(e) (2002); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§18.200(f)(5),(8) (2003); 
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(b) (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE 
tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020.C.4-5 (2002). 
 42. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(i)(1)(h) (2002); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(2)(f) (2003) 
(using the term “substantial cost savings” instead of “best interest”); S.F., CAL., 
ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.5-1(a)(3) (2002). 
 43. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(j) (2003); MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003) (noting under the 
definition of “employee benefits” that such benefits shall be provided “unless 
otherwise prohibited by state, federal[,] or other law”); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 
12B, § 12B.6 (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.F 
(2002) (noting under the definition of “employee benefits” that “it does not 
include benefits to the extent that . . . such benefits may be preempted by federal 
or state law”). 
 44. A “severability clause” is “[a] provision that keeps the remaining 
provisions of a contract or statute in force if any portion of that contract or statute 
is judicially declared void or unconstitutional.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1378 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
 45. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(k) (2002); MINNEAPOLIS, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1.20 (2003); S.F., CAL., 
ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.6 (2002); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 
20.45, tit. 1, ch. 1.04, § 1.04.010 (2002). 
 46. Compare MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§ 
18.200(c), (k) (2003) (requiring all subcontractors to comply if they meet the 
minimum contract amount and employee number requirements) and S.F., CAL., 
ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, §§ 12B.1(c), 12B.2 (2002) (requiring subcontractors to 
7
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requires the provision of domestic partner benefits by contractors 
whose contracts are of marginal monetary value, the cities 
substantially differ on how large the city contract must be to trigger 
their domestic partner benefit requirement.47  Minneapolis’ 
ordinance is somewhat more limited than other cities in that its 
ordinance applies only to contractors that employ twenty-one or 
more employees.48  The cities differ as to whether the contracting 
entity must provide benefits to all its employees or only those whose 
work involves the city contract.49  The benefits city contractors must 
offer domestic partners differ slightly, with Seattle requiring the 
provision of the most comprehensive list of benefits, and 
Minneapolis requiring the least.50  Finally, each city except Seattle 
 
comply if their work comprises ten percent or more of any subcontract), with L.A., 
CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2(b)(12) (2002) (not requiring 
subcontractors to comply “unless they have another contract directly with the 
City”) and SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.030 (2002) (“[t]he 
requirements of this chapter shall not apply to . . .  subcontractors”). 
 47. See L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.1 (2002) (defining 
“contract” as any agreement with the city, large or small); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2003) (requiring that contractors 
provide domestic partner benefits only if the value of the city contract exceeds 
$100,000); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B,  § 12B.1(c) (2002) (limiting “contract” 
to only those agreements that cumulatively exceed $5,000 per year); SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010.A (2002) (applying the ordinance 
only to contractors whose contract with the city is valued at $33,000 or more). 
 48. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) 
(2003). 
 49. Compare L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(e)(2) (2002) 
(requiring the contractor offer benefits only to the employees whose work is 
related to the city contract) and SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 
20.45.030 (requiring the same as L.A.), with MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §§ 18.200(c), 18.200(f)(1) (2003) (requiring city 
contractors to allow “every employee” to be eligible for benefits) and S.F., CAL., 
ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.1(d) (2002) (mandating that city contractors provide 
benefits to all their employees regardless of whether all the employees are 
engaged in work related to the city contract). 
 50. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, § 10.8.2.1(b)(2) (2002) (including 
bereavement leave, family medical leave, health benefits, membership discounts, 
moving expenses, pension and retirement benefits, and travel benefits); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) (2002) 
(including bereavement leave, disability insurance, life insurance, health benefits, 
dental benefits, family leave, memberships, moving expenses, and travel benefits); 
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.1(b) (2002) (including bereavement leave, 
family medical leave, health benefits, membership or membership discounts, 
moving expenses, pension and retirement benefits, and travel benefits); SEATTLE, 
WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.020F (2002) (including bereavement 
leave; disability, life, other types of insurance; family medical leave; health benefits; 
membership or membership discounts; moving expenses; pensions and retirement 
benefits; vacation; and travel benefits).  Seattle defines benefits in the broadest 
8
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mandates contractor compliance only for the duration of the city 
contract.51 
C.  The Impact of Municipal Domestic Partner Legislation 
The recent expansion of domestic partner benefits legislation 
is illustrative of the general trend among large cities to enact social 
policies intended to reach well beyond their own borders.52  San 
Francisco has a “Burma” ordinance prohibiting companies that 
have employees in Burma or hold an interest in Burmese 
corporations from contracting with the city.53  For its part, 
Minneapolis has attempted to “address social issues ranging from 
organic food to the country of Myanmar.”54 
The results of municipal domestic partner benefits legislation 
have been far-reaching.  Approximately 5700 employers nationwide 
offer health insurance benefits to same-sex domestic partners.55  
Most companies that offer domestic partner benefits to their 
employees ostensibly do so in connection with city ordinances 
requiring domestic partner benefits.56  As of October 2001, more 
than seventy percent of companies across the nation that provide 
domestic partner benefits have contracted with San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, or Seattle.57  While subsequent litigation has narrowed the 
 
terms, requiring also that contractors provide domestic partners with “any other 
benefits given to employees [consistent with federal and state law].”  Id.  
Minneapolis mandates the narrowest range of benefits by excluding retirement 
and pension benefits altogether.  See MINNEAPOLIS CODE § 18.200(c). 
 51. L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE div. 10, ch. 1, §§ 10.8.2, 10.8.2(c)(3) (2002); 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f)(3) (2003); S.F., 
CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12B, § 12B.2 (2002) (“In the performance of a 
contract . . .”).  Seattle makes no mention of the limitation that the benefits 
provided be during the duration of the contract with the city.  See SEATTLE, WASH., 
MUN. CODE tit. 20, ch. 20.45, § 20.45.010-050 (2002). 
 52. See Brauch, supra note 4, at 929. 
 53. Allen Samuelson, Doing Business with the Sovereign: Unique Terms and 
Disputes in Public Agency IT Contracts, 700 PLI/PAT 91, 111 (2002) (referring to S.F., 
CAL., ADMIN. CODE  ch. 12J, § 12J.1 (2002)). 
 54. Olson, supra note 2. 
 55. See Access Domestic Partners: More Employers Offer Health Benefits, Study, 10 AM. 
POL. NETWORK-AM. HEALTH LINE No. 9 (May 19, 2003). 
 56. Glen E. Lavy, Corporate Resource Council Manual, Behind the Rhetoric: The 
Social Goals of GLBT Advocacy in Corporate America, at 5, available at 
http://www.corporateresourcecouncil.org/white_papers/Behind_The_Rhetoric.p
df (citing Human Rights Campaign (HRC), The State of the Workplace 2001, at 18-19 
(fig. 6), available at www.hrc.org/worknet/publications/state_workplace/2001/ 
sow2001.pdf) (last visited Dec. 28, 2003)). 
 57. See id. 
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breadth of some of these ordinances,58 companies have been forced 
to act with the understanding that unless they provide benefits to 
their employees’ domestic partners anywhere they do business, they 
will lose their contract(s) with these cities.59  For its part, 
Minneapolis’ ordinance has the potential to affect 150 contractor-
employers per year.60  In a very real sense, San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, and Seattle are dictating employment policy beyond their 
own borders.61  The question is, is it within Minneapolis’ legal 
discretion to join these cities? 
III. “HOME RULE” AUTHORITY 
A.  Definition and Significance 
The ramifications of domestic partner ordinances have not 
gone unnoticed.  Since the movement to recognize domestic 
partnerships began, measures requiring municipalities to provide 
domestic partner benefits to employees frequently have been 
challenged in court.62  Challenges to local domestic partnership 
laws usually encompass the argument that such measures go 
beyond the “home rule” authority.63 
“Home rule” authority is defined generally as the discretion 
given to municipalities by the state to manage municipal affairs.64  
More specifically, “home rule” authority is “the ability of a local 
 
 58. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Brauch, supra note 4, at 929. 
 60. See Olson, supra note 2.  In 2002, Minneapolis “took 150 bids and 
proposals for contracts worth more than $100,000.”  Id. 
 61. See HRC, supra note 56, at 18-19. 
 62. See Miller, supra note 21, at § 2. 
 63. Id.  A list of cases ruling on domestic partner benefits follows: Irizarry v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001); Schaefer v. City & County of 
Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So. 
2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997); City of 
Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 
N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 801 A.2d 148 (Md. 
2002); Connors v. City of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999); Opinions of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 696 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1998); Lilly v. City 
of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 
1995); Slattery v. City of New York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999), appeal 
transferred, 711 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 1999); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 
A.2d 980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 
2000); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001). 
 64. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 108 (2003). 
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government to act and make policy in all areas that have not been 
designated to be of statewide interest through general law.”65  In 
spite of its name, “home rule” authority “admits to the possibility 
that state government actions may severely limit local autonomy 
and discretion.”66  “Home rule” authority can be granted by either 
statute or state constitution.67  “Under home-rule [constitutional] 
amendments, cities no longer are dependent upon the state 
legislature for their authority to determine their local affairs and 
government . . . .”68  “Although home-rule power generally is 
subject to some limitation by constitutional provision or legislation, 
the extent of limitations on home-rule powers varies from state to 
state.”69 
B.  Diversity among State “Home Rule” Authority Laws 
The breadth of a state’s “home rule” authority laws may 
determine the fate of a particular jurisdiction’s domestic partner 
benefits legislation.70  Further, courts’ analysis of whether local 
ordinances are consistent with state law is an important factor in 
deciding whether such laws will survive court challenges.71  Some 
jurisdictions “have construed the preemptive effect of state civil 
rights legislation narrowly[] to leave ample room for locally 
initiated measures,” whereas others have “adopted an expansive 
view of state preemption,” leaving such measures ripe to be struck 
down.72  Largely as a consequence of different state interpretations 
of “home rule” authority, some domestic partner benefits 
ordinances have survived court challenges, while others have been 
struck down on the grounds that they conflict with, or are 
preempted by, state law.73  Atlanta appears to be the only city that 
 
 65. Dale Krane et al., Introduction to HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE 
HANDBOOK 2 (Dale Krane et al. eds., CQ Press 2001). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 110 (2000). 
 68. Id. § 108. 
 69. Id., § 110. 
 70. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2357 
(2003). 
 71. See Miller, supra note 21, at § 2. 
 72. Barron, supra note 70, at 2357. 
 73. See id.  The following cases have upheld domestic partner ordinances: 
Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that a Chicago Board of Education policy extending health benefits to same-sex 
domestic partners did not violate the equal protection rights of employees who 
11
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has successfully defended domestic partner benefits legislation in 
state court after having its initial ordinance struck down.74 
While San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis 
have substantially similar domestic partner benefits ordinances 
requiring city contractors to provide benefits to their employees,75 
the “home rule” authority laws vary among their respective states.  
 
cohabited with opposite-sex couples); Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 
P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a city ordinance extending health 
benefits to domestic partners of city employees did not exceed home rule 
authority granted by the state); Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (denying a challenge to domestic partner ordinance on the 
grounds that plaintiff taxpayer lacked the requisite standing under state law to 
bring suit); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding a county did not intrude on a matter reserved for the state alone in 
providing domestic partner benefits); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 
(Ga. 1997) (holding that  a city ordinance was within the city’s home rule 
authority to enact because it did not use any language recognizing new family 
relationships similar to marriage); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1999) (holding a city domestic partner ordinance was a permissible 
exercise under the state’s home rule authority); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 714 
N.E.2d 335 (Md. 2002) (same); Opinions of the Justices to the House of 
Representatives, 696 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1998) (advising state legislature that a bill 
authorizing cities to offer domestic partner benefits to their employees’ partners 
did not constitute an unlawful delegation of authority); Slattery v. City of New 
York, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (dismissing taxpayer’s action 
challenging city domestic partner ordinance that extended health and retirement 
benefits); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001) (holding that a 
“home rule” city could enact domestic partner benefits legislation). 
  The cases that struck down domestic partner benefits ordinances include: 
City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (holding a city ordinance 
that recognizes domestic partners as family relationships as well as providing 
benefits to domestic partners exceeds home rule authority); Connors v. City of 
Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999) (striking down a domestic partner benefits 
order because the city’s mayor exceeded his authority in issuing the executive 
order); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev. 
denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1995) (holding that a city domestic partner ordinance 
conflicted with state law and was an exercise beyond the city’s “home rule” 
authority); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) 
(holding that a city domestic partner ordinance created a new form of marital 
relationship in violation of state public policy); Arlington County v. White, 528 
S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2000) (holding that a county attempt to provide insurance 
coverage for employees’ unmarried domestic partners is ultra vires). 
 74. Compare McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (striking down a city domestic partner 
benefits ordinance), with Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (upholding the same city’s 
revised version of a domestic partner ordinance).  The Morgan court upheld 
Atlanta’s revised domestic partner benefits ordinance on the grounds that the city 
“carefully avoided the constitutional flaw in its previous benefits ordinance by 
eliminating . . . [from its] definition of ‘dependent’ any language recognizing any 
new family relationship similar to marriage.” Morgan, 492 S.E.2d at 195. 
 75. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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This variance in part explains why Minneapolis’ city employee-
domestic partner benefits legislation was struck down in court76 
while similar domestic partner benefits legislation was upheld in 
California77 and Washington.78  In contrast to Minnesota,79 
California grants expansive “home rule” powers.80  California gives 
power permissively to its local governments, leaving them “subject 
to few limitations other than to abstain from running deficit 
spending.”81  In Washington, “the parameters within which local 
governments can exercise home rule powers are quite limited.”82  
The fact that Washington courts upheld domestic partner benefits 
legislation is an anomaly given the state’s stringent interpretation 
of “home rule” authority generally.83  In any event, the different 
outcomes of prior domestic partner benefits legislation helps 
illustrate the importance of focusing on a particular state’s 
interpretation of “home rule” authority in determining whether 
such legislation will survive a court challenge. 
 
 76. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 107. 
 77. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the San Francisco ordinance is neither duplicative nor 
contradictory to state law, and is not an exercise beyond the city’s authority); S.D. 
Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding the San Francisco ordinance is valid because a city may regulate outside 
its geographic bounds so long as its actions are an exercise of the city’s proprietary 
contracting power). 
 78. See Heinsma, 29 P.3d at 713 (holding that a home-rule city could enact 
domestic partner benefits legislation). 
 79. See infra Part III.C. 
 80. See Michael A. Woods, The Propriety of Local Government Protections of Gays 
and Lesbians from Discriminatory Employment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515, 532 (2003). 
 81. Id.  “In California . . . localities trace the source of their power to two key 
state constitutional sections.  The first provides that ‘[a] county or city may make 
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and 
regulations not in conflict with general laws.’ ” Id. at 531-32 (quoting CAL. CONST. 
art. XI, § 7). “The second permits a city or county to adopt and amend its charter 
‘[f]or its own government,’ by a majority vote of those citizens entitled to vote.”  
Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. X., § 3(a)). “California courts have broadly construed 
the constitutional grant of local power over ‘municipal affairs . . . .’ ”  Id. (citing 
Alvin D. Sokolow & Peter M. Detwiler, California, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra 
note 65, at 58).  Municipalities in California have thus had “considerable 
discretion in the crafting of social policy.” Id. 
 82. Meredith A. Newman & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Washington, in HOME RULE IN 
AMERICA, supra note 65, at 437. 
 83. See generally Heinsma, 29 P.3d 709.  The court, while noting that 
Washington had statutes in place favoring heterosexual marriage, concluded that 
the legislature did not define “dependents” to exclude domestic partners, and 
therefore upheld the municipal ordinance.  Id. at 712. 
13
Bayse: Pulling the Lilly from the Pond? Minneapolis Wades into Domestic
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:01 PM 
944 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
C.  “Home Rule” Authority in Minnesota 
Minnesota, though far from stingy in allowing for local 
autonomy, exercises more oversight over localities than California 
but less than Washington.  Historically, the Minnesota Legislature 
was slow to embrace a process for localities to obtain “home rule.”84  
After originally rejecting legislation authorizing “home rule” in 
1895, the Minnesota Legislature passed legislation authorizing 
cities to adopt “home rule” charters in 1896.85  This legislation did 
not extend to municipalities such as towns, villages, and other local 
governments until 1987, however.86  Since then, the Minnesota 
Constitution has permitted local government units to obtain and 
adopt their own “home rule” charters.87 
“Home rule” status in Minnesota does not necessarily mean 
more autonomy for localities.88  Despite the formal legal 
designation of “home rule” for some Minnesota cities, the 
“operational differences evident [in such cities’] powers and 
functions” are not always apparent.89  Minnesota courts have long 
sought to oversee city actions to enforce the boundaries of “home 
rule” authority.90  In so doing, Minnesota courts often recite 
something akin to Dillon’s Rule,91 which reflects the long-standing 
notion that municipal power is wholly derived from the state.92  
 
 84. See Philip H. Wichern, Minnesota, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 65, 
at 225. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  For a more complete history of the limits of “home rule” in 
Minnesota, see generally id.; Note, Municipal Civil Rights Legislation—Is the Power 
Conferred by the Grant of Home Rule?, 53 MINN. L. REV. 342 (1968); Terrance 
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 
MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964). 
 87. See MINN. CONST. art. 12, § 4, which states, in pertinent part: “Any local 
government unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for its 
government.” 
 88. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 225. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. (citing Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S 365 
(1926); State v. Clarke Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 238 Minn. 192, 56 N.W.2d 667 
(1952); State v. Houston, 210 Minn. 379, 298 N.W. 358 (1941)). 
 91. Dillon’s Rule states that “[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to, 
and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.”  City of Clinton v. 
Cedar Rapids & M.R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).  Although the “modern 
trend has been toward a broad grant of authority to municipalities and other local 
government bodies,” Dillon’s Rule remains influential and persists to this day.  
Woods, supra note 80, at 521. 
 92. See Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984) (stating 
“[a] municipality has no inherent powers, but only such powers as are expressly 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/4
BAYSE - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:01 PM 
2004] PULLING THE LILLY FROM THE POND? 945 
Courts have stated that Minnesota cities have “wide discretion in 
dealing with matters of local importance.”93  Despite this 
proclamation, “[t]he distinction between statewide and local 
concern has a rich and confused history in local government law.”94  
The “external effects of local activity have typically been at the core 
of the inquiry [into whether an ordinance is of local or statewide 
concern].”95 
The “home rule” authority test applied by Minnesota courts 
states that a municipal regulation may be invalid if it either 
expressly or impliedly conflicts with a state statute,96 or if it 
legislates in a realm occupied by the state.97  Minnesota courts have 
 
conferred by statute or are implied as necessary in aid of those powers which are 
expressly conferred.) (citing Minnetonka Elect. Co. v. Vill. of Golden Valley, 273 
Minn. 301, 141 N.W.2d 138 (1966); Vill. of Brooklyn Ctr. v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 
334, 96 N.W.2d 585 (1959)); Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 
221, 225, 125 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1964) (indicating “[t]he city’s right to act . . . as 
always, is dependent upon a grant from the state”); Mangold Midwest Co. v. Vill. of 
Richfield, 274 Minn. 347, 357, 143 N.W.2d 813, 820 (1966) (stating “municipalities 
have no inherent powers . . . .”). 
 93. Arcadia, 267 Minn. at 225, 125 N.W.2d at 850 (citing City of Duluth v. 
Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944)). 
 94. Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1347, 1400 (1997) (discussing the statewide concern issue in reference 
to the Lilly decision). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Mangold, 274 Minn. at 352, 143 N.W.2d at 816 (ruling that conflict 
exists between a local ordinance and state statute when “both the ordinance and 
the statute contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each 
other”).  Express conflict between an ordinance and statute occurs when a statute 
“specifies withdrawal, limitation, or restriction of [the] municipal power [at 
issue],” or limits the “methods of procedure open to municipalities [so as to 
render the ordinance invalid].”  George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State 
Restraint upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REV. 643, 
647 (1993).  Implied conflict exists when “the [state] legislature intends to deny 
that power [a municipality is trying to exercise] which [the legislature] does not 
expressly grant.”  Id. 
 97. See Vaubel, supra note 96, at 647; see also Mangold, 274 Minn. at 356, 143 
N.W.2d at 819 (noting “it is our opinion that preemption and conflict are separate 
concepts and should be governed by separate doctrines.”).  The court likened 
preemption to the “occupation of the field” concept familiar in federalism 
disputes between states and the federal government.  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has summarized the concept as follows: 
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted 
where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be inferred from 
a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it,” or where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field in which the federal 
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
15
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not hesitated to use state powers when localities tread on issues that 
reach beyond their borders.98  Despite the limited nature of “home 
rule” in Minnesota, it is noteworthy that as a general rule 
“[c]ontracting, purchasing, and bidding procedures are primarily 
within the powers of local governments.”99  Even this discretion is 
limited, however, “by state requirements.”100 
As ambiguous or confusing as Minnesota’s “home rule” 
authority may seem, it may simply be described as an attempt to 
allow localities to address matters of concern to them while 
preserving for the state the sole prerogative of addressing matters 
of concern to the entire state. 
IV. THE LILLY DECISION 
The City of Minneapolis’ (the City) recent attempt to mandate 
domestic partner benefits is part of an ongoing effort by the city to 
expand domestic partner benefits.101  The Minneapolis City Council 
attempted to legislate in the area of domestic partner benefits on 
January 25, 1991.102  Under the Domestic Partner Ordinance 
(DPO)103 and city resolutions 93R-106 and 93R-342, domestic 
partners of city employees were entitled to receive the same health 
benefits that legal spouses would otherwise have received from the 
city, unless the domestic partner already had access to other health 
insurance coverage.104  The DPO defined domestic partners as two 
adults who are not related, unmarried, have no other domestic 
partner, are “jointly responsible to each other for the necessities of 
life,” and “are committed to one another to the same extent as 
 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 98. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 122-24 (Minn. 1984) 
(ruling a municipality is without jurisdiction to regulate dredging public waters 
because the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has exclusive 
jurisdiction over such matters); Arcadia, 267 Minn. at 224, 228, 125 N.W.2d at 849, 
852 (concluding city council’s action to deny permit for corporation to display its 
business sign on its property exceeded the bounds of city authority); Nordmarken 
v. City of Richfield, 641 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that state 
law preempts a home rule city from using the referendum process to approve or 
disapprove municipal land use and development laws). 
 99. Wichern, supra note 84, at 227. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See supra Parts II.A-B and accompanying text. 
 102. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
 103. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142 (1991). 
 104. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 109. 
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married persons are to each other.”105 
Soon after the DPO passed, a Minneapolis resident and 
taxpayer, James A. Lilly (Lilly), sought to enjoin the City from 
disbursing benefits to domestic partners.106  Lilly argued that the 
City’s “health care coverage for same sex domestic partners 
contravened state public policy and violated state law.”107  Both the 
district court108 and court of appeals109 ruled in favor of Lilly. 
The court of appeals based its decision on the limitations of 
Minnesota’s “home rule” authority.110  In so doing, the court 
emphatically rejected the City’s claim that “its action is of a local 
concern only and does not conflict with state law.”111  Although the 
“home rule” authority Minnesota grants to its cities is not 
restrictive, it is only as broad as the state constitution and state 
statutes allow.112  According to the court: 
A municipality has no inherent powers, but only such 
powers as are expressly conferred by statute or are implied 
as necessary in aid of those powers which are expressly 
conferred. . . . [I]f a matter presents a statewide problem, the 
implied necessary powers of a municipality to regulate are 
narrowly construed unless the legislature has expressly provided 
otherwise.113 
The court affirmed the district court’s determination that the 
provision of insurance coverage for municipal employees and their 
dependents is a matter of statewide concern.114  Moreover, the 
court determined that the matter of domestic partner benefits 
 
 105. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991). 
 106. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 109. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, No. MC 93-21375, 1994 WL 315620, at *4 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. June 3, 1994). 
 109. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 108. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 111. 
 112. Lilly, 1994 WL 315620, at *2 (conclusion of law no. 5) (citing MINN. 
CONST. art. 12, § 4; MINN. STAT. §§ 410.04, 410.03, & 410.07 (1993); State ex rel. 
Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958); Park v. 
City of Duluth, 134  Minn. 296, 298, 59 N.W. 627, 628 (1916); Am. Elec. Co. v. City 
of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 330, 333-34, 113 N.W.2d 899 (1907); City of 
Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights v. Univ. of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 843 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 
1984))). 
 113. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111 (quoting Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 
117, 120 (Minn. 1984)). 
 114. Id. 
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concerns “the statewide problem of discrimination.”115  The court 
ruled that “the definition of family relationships and dependent 
status, are statewide concerns.”116 The court therefore concluded 
that the City’s authority to combat discrimination must be narrowly 
construed.117 
The court rejected the City’s argument that in providing 
domestic partner benefits to its employees it was merely applying 
the Minnesota Human Rights Act,118 which prohibits discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.119  The court noted clear 
legislative intent to eliminate discrimination but to not endorse 
homosexual lifestyles or provide additional benefits to domestic 
partners,120 citing Minnesota’s anti-discrimination statute 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which 
in pertinent part provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to . . . mean that the state of Minnesota condones 
homosexuality or bisexuality or any equivalent lifestyle [or to] 
authorize the recognition of marriage between persons of the same 
sex.”121  Also cited were comments in the Senate during debate to 
amend Minnesota’s Human Rights Act indicating “there is nothing 
in [the Act] about [ ] domestic partners benefits.  Nothing that 
could lead to it.”122 
The court concluded that the DPO, narrowly construed, 
conflicted with Minnesota’s municipal benefits statute.123  Under 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 113. 
 117. Id. 
 118. MINN. STAT. §§ 363-363.15 (1992). 
 119. MINN. STAT. § 363.10 (1992). 
 120. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (1993); 
Prohibiting Unfair Discriminatory Practices on the Basis of Sexual or Affectional 
Orientation: Hearing on S.F. 444, 1993 Leg., 78th Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Allen Spear)). 
 121. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 112 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (1993)). 
 122. Id. (quoting Hearing, supra note 120 (statement of Sen. Allen Spear)). 
 123. Id. at 113 (referring to MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (1992)).  Minnesota’s 
municipal benefits statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
A . . . municipal corporation, . . . other political subdivision or other 
body corporate and politic of this state . . . may insure or protect its or 
their officers and employees, and their dependents, or any class or 
classes of officers, employees, or dependents, under a policy or policies 
or contract or contracts of group insurance or benefits covering . . . 
medical and surgical benefits and hospitalization insurance or benefits 
for both employees and dependents . . . . A payment is deemed to be 
additional compensation paid to the officers or employees. 
MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subd. 1 (2002). 
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the court’s reasoning, the statute specifically defined “dependents” 
to the exclusion of unmarried domestic partners.124  The Lilly 
decision sent a clear message to Minnesota cities considering 
enactment of domestic partnership measures: leave it to the state to 
legislate in the area of domestic partner benefits.125 
V. MINNEAPOLIS’  DOMESTIC PARTNER ORDINANCE 
AIMED AT CITY CONTRACTORS126 
Despite the clear message of Lilly, Minneapolis recently 
reentered the realm of domestic partner benefits legislation.127  
This time, Minneapolis passed an ordinance targeted at city 
contractors rather than the city itself.128 
A.  Purpose 
Minneapolis has framed the debate over domestic partners as 
one of social justice and economic efficiency.129  The stated purpose 
of Minneapolis’ city contractor ordinance is to recognize that “a 
nationwide debate has advanced an expanded concept of familial 
relationships beyond traditional, marital relationships.”130  
According to the City, “this expanded concept includes 
relationships between two (2) non-married, adult partners who are 
committed to one another to the same extent as married persons 
are to each other.”131  In requiring city contractors to provide 
domestic partner benefits, the City claims that “the quality of goods 
and services that city receives” will improve.132  The ordinance 
nowhere states, however, that the City will receive equivalent goods 
or services at the same or lower cost.133 
 
 124. The court noted that the legislature had twice amended the statute to 
define dependents, once to include “spouse and minor unmarried children” and 
once to include “dependent students under the age of 25.”  Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 
111.  Nowhere did the definition include non-marital relationships, however.  See 
id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003). 
 127. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) 
(2003). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
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B.  Scope 
The ordinance at first glance appears to be broader in scope 
than it actually is.  The ordinance states: 
No contractor shall discriminate by policy or practice in 
the provision of employee benefits between an employee 
with a domestic partner and an employee with a spouse.  
Any employee benefit provided in any manner contingent 
upon the existence of a marital relationship must also be 
provided to an employee who has a domestic partner.134 
The definitions used in the statute narrow the ordinance’s 
scope.135  A “contractor” is an employer who “maintains 21 or more 
employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar 
workweeks.”136  “Contract” is limited to deals with the city in which 
the estimated total value exceeds $100,000.137  “Employee benefits” 
include “bereavement leave, disability insurance, life insurance, 
health benefits, dental benefits, family leave, memberships, moving 
expenses, and travel benefits.”138  “Domestic partners” are any two 
partners, including same-sex couples, who are not relatives and 
“are committed to one another to the same extent as married 
persons are to each other.”139 
In addition to its definitional qualifications, the Minneapolis 
City Council attempted to narrow its compliance requirements.140  
The ordinance applies to the portions of a contractor’s operations 
that occur “within the City” or “[e]lsewhere within the United 
States where work related to a contract is being performed.”141  The 
statute leaves unclear what exactly these terms mean to a contractor 
whose operations overlap, or whose employees’ work bears an 
indirect relationship to other employees’ work.142  The ordinance 
also states that contractors need only offer domestic partner 
 
 134. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) 
(2003). 
 135. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) 
(2003). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i), (j) 
(2003). 
 141. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i)(1), 
(3) (2003). 
 142. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(i)(1), 
(3) (2003). 
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benefits during the duration of the contract with the City.143  
Employers must create and implement a domestic partner registry 
for their employees before bidding with the city, however.144  The 
ordinance applies to subcontractors as well as contractors, adding 
significant breadth to its scope.145 
C.  Exceptions 
Several noteworthy exceptions to the ordinance exist.  
Contractors that need not comply with the ordinance include those 
with a grant or agreement with a public agency, government 
entities,146 and religious organizations and institutions.147  Further, 
the city council itself may grant exceptions to the ordinance in 
response to an emergency or if it is in the “best interests” of the 
City.148  Factors the city council can use to determine “best 
interests” include whether any bidder can comply with the 
ordinance, the services are unique and can be provided by only one 
bidder, there is only one bidder, and the City would gain 
“substantial cost savings” by granting an exception.149 
VI. DOES MINNEAPOLIS’ RECENT DOMESTIC PARTNER ORDINANCE 
COMPLY WITH LILLY? 
Minneapolis’ ordinance employs different means to achieve 
the same objective of the ordinance struck down in Lilly.  The 
 
 143. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(j) 
(2003). 
 144. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f) 
(2003). 
 145. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, §18.200(k) 
(2003). 
 146. It is here that Minneapolis ironically exempts itself from its own 
ordinance. 
 147. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(f)(5)-(8) 
(2003).  The religious exception ostensibly is Minneapolis’ attempt to avoid First 
Amendment difficulties under the Free Exercise Clause.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16  (“The right of every man to worship God according to 
the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be 
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or 
interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be 
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship”). 
 148. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(g)(1)-(2) 
(2003). 
 149. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 
18.200(g)(2)(b)-(f) (2003). 
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question is whether Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city contractor 
ordinance should be struck down under Minnesota law as an ultra 
vires150 act.  An act is ultra vires if it expressly or impliedly conflicts 
with state law, or if it is preempted because the state has already 
chosen to legislate in a particular field.151  It is true that 
Minneapolis’ two domestic partner ordinances152 are factually 
distinct in that requiring private contractors to provide domestic 
partner benefits is not the same as mandating the city do the same 
for its employees.153  Nevertheless, this comment argues that the 
ordinance is ultra vires under a Lilly analysis principally because the 
overarching objective to legislate municipal benefits, marriage and 
family, and anti-discrimination policies beyond the borders of the 
city remains the same.154  Applying the Lilly analysis to Minneapolis’ 
recent domestic partner ordinance renders it an ultra vires act.155 
A.  Should Minnesota Law Be Strictly Construed Against the City? 
The standard under which a court reviews Minneapolis’ 
domestic partner benefits ordinance will in large part determine 
whether it withstands judicial scrutiny.  In Lilly, the implied 
necessary powers of the City of Minneapolis to legislate in the 
realm of domestic partner benefits were strictly construed vis-à-vis 
Minnesota Statutes section 471.61 because such legislation 
intruded upon three realms of policy occupied by the state.156  The 
rule of Lilly is that the state already occupies three areas of law: 
oversight of the provision of insurance benefits for municipal 
employees under section 471.61, anti-discrimination law, and 
marriage law.157  If a city intrudes upon any one of these three 
areas, state law is strictly construed against the locality because each 
 
 150. Ultra vires means “unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or 
granted by a corporate charter or by law.”  BLACK’S, supra note 44, at 1525. 
 151. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.  Note the distinction 
between conflict and preemption, either of which taken separately can render an 
ordinance invalid. 
 152. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 (2003) & 
tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991). 
 153. Compare MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200 
(2003) (requiring city contractors to provide benefits to their employees), with 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142, § 142.20 (1991) 
(providing benefits directly to city employees). 
 154. See infra Parts V.A.-C. and accompanying text. 
 155. See infra Parts VI.A.-C. and accompanying text. 
 156. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995). 
 157. See id. at 111-13. 
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is considered a statewide concern.158  Minneapolis’ recent domestic 
partner benefits ordinance may intrude upon state municipal 
benefits policy.  The Minneapolis ordinance almost certainly 
intrudes upon state anti-discrimination and family policies in the 
same way as Minneapolis’ first domestic partner benefits ordinance. 
Whether the Minneapolis ordinance intrudes upon the realm 
of state municipal benefits policy is unclear.  Section 471.61 of 
Minnesota Statutes provides: 
A . . . municipal corporation . . . other political subdivision 
or other body corporate and political of this state . . . may 
insure or protect its or their officers and employees, and 
their dependents, or any class or classes of officers, 
employees, or dependents, under a policy or policies or 
contract or contracts of group insurance benefits 
covering . . . medical and surgical benefits and 
hospitalization insurance or benefits for both employees 
and dependents . . . .  A payment is deemed to be 
additional compensation paid to the officers or 
employees.159 
Thus, the state affirmatively grants municipalities the power to 
insure their own employees’ dependents.160  Depending on how the 
court interprets the statute, this could mean one of two things.  
Broadly interpreted, the statute means that the state occupies the 
realm of municipal employee benefits policy.161  This interpretation 
would lend itself to a strict construction against Minneapolis’ power 
to mandate contractors provide employee benefits.  Narrowly 
interpreted, the statute shows the state occupies policies 
surrounding the provision of benefits to municipal employees only, 
lending itself to a broad construction of city power.162  That 
interpretation would avoid a strict construction of the City’s powers 
under state law. 
This dispute over statutory interpretation can be settled by 
looking to the policy issue that undergirds statutory construction of 
municipal powers, which is to avoid city intrusion into matters of 
statewide concern.163  Viewed in this light, Minneapolis’ ordinance 
 
 158. Id. at 113. 
 159. MINN. STAT. § 471.61, subd. 1 (2002). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995). 
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reaches further beyond city boundaries than did its first.  Whereas 
the first ordinance applied only to city employees,164 the second 
potentially applies to any contractor within the state with more 
than twenty employees.165  Still, the first of the three bases for 
determining that the City’s first ordinance concerned a statewide 
problem is open to debate. 
While some question exists as to whether Minneapolis’ city 
contractor ordinance intrudes upon the realm of state municipal 
benefits policy, the two other factors the Lilly court used to find 
that the first ordinance legislated in a matter of statewide concern 
remain applicable.  First, the City still attempts to legislate in the 
realm of domestic partner benefits, which the Lilly Court said dealt 
with “the statewide problem of discrimination.”166  Second, under a 
Lilly analysis, domestic partnership laws deal with “the definition of 
family relationships and dependent status,” which the court said 
are “statewide concerns.”167 
Under the Lilly framework, Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city 
contractor ordinance enters at least two, maybe three, fields of law 
occupied by the state.  Therefore, the power of the City to require 
city contractors to provide domestic partner benefits should be 
construed narrowly, provided that Lilly is upheld.168 
B.  Does Minneapolis’ Recent Domestic Partner Benefits Ordinance 
Conflict with State Law, or Is It Preempted by State Public Policy? 
Given that the City’s powers should be narrowly construed, the 
ordinance is ripe to be struck down if it in any way conflicts with 
state statutory law.169  “Municipal legislation must also comply with 
the state constitution, and with state public policy as disclosed in 
the general law.”170  A close analysis reveals that the ordinance is 
not entirely harmonious with state law and public policy with 
 
 164. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 142 (1991). 
 165. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(c) 
(2003). 
 166. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111. 
 167. Id. at 113. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 111 (stating that the cities have no power to legislate in areas 
“expressly or impliedly withheld” by the state (quoting State ex rel. Lowell v. City 
of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958)); Lilly v. City of 
Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620 at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994) (conclusion of law no. 
9) (same). 
 170. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620 at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994) 
(conclusion of law no. 9) (citing Lowell, 252 Minn. at 528, 91 N.W.2d at 83). 
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regard to municipal benefits, family, and anti-discrimination policy. 
The first issue is whether the Minneapolis ordinance conflicts 
with Minnesota Statutes section 471.61.  Section 471.61 only 
authorizes a city to “insure or protect its . . . employees . . . and 
their dependents.”171  In the absence of express authorization 
permitting a municipality to mandate benefits for contracting 
employees, a Minnesota city may not have such authority.172  A 
municipality, perhaps, is only expressly given the statutory power to 
insure its own employees.173  Requiring city contractors to provide 
domestic partner benefits could be an ultra vires act because 
Minnesota cities have the authority only to provide employment 
benefits to their own employees.174  On the other hand, it could be 
argued that section 471.61 only relates to benefits municipalities 
can offer their own employees, and has nothing to say about cities 
dealing with their contractors.175  If that were so, then no conflict 
would exist between the ordinance and section 471.61.176  Hence, 
the characterization game: Is section 471.61 a statute about a city’s 
power to provide benefits generally or simply city benefits to city 
employees?  It is here that a court’s standard of statutory 
construction becomes relevant.177  Because family and anti-
discrimination policies are deemed to be statewide concerns, the 
state statute must be construed narrowly.178  Under a narrow 
construction of state law, the City again finds itself in trouble 
because section 471.61 authorizes cities only to offer benefits to the 
beneficiaries of their own employees.179 
In addition to conflicting with section 471.61, Minneapolis’ 
ordinance should also be preempted because it treads upon state 
domestic relations and marriage policy, both of which are fields of 
 
 171. MINN. STAT. § 471.61 subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 172. See Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 1984). 
 173. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (“A municipal corporation . . . may insure or 
protect its . . . officers and employees”) (emphasis added). 
 174. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 (2002). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995). 
 178. See id. 
 179. An even more interesting question is whether cities can require that 
benefits be given to contractors’ employees that they cannot offer their employees.  
That is, to what extent does a city have the right to mandate that private 
contractors do something that it cannot do itself? 
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law reserved by and for the state.180  Minnesota law expressly and 
pervasively speaks to the area of domestic relations and the benefits 
to be derived from state recognized marital relationships.181  
Indeed, Minnesota has a long-standing public policy to provide 
state recognition and benefits to marriage as the state defines it.182  
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Baker 
v. Nelson,183 was among the first courts to uphold a state statute 
prohibiting same-sex marriage.184  Minnesota statutes define 
marriage as between one man and one woman.185  In 1997, 
Minnesota passed a Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) expressly 
prohibiting marriage between persons of the same sex.186  In 
addition, Minnesota statutes expressly disclaim any condoning, 
authorization, or recognition of “homosexuality, bisexuality, or any 
equivalent lifestyle.”187  Most recently, Minnesota repealed the state 
law enabling state agencies to offer domestic partner benefits to 
state employees.188  Taken together, Minnesota case law and statutes 
 
 180. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 113 (stating that the definition of family 
relationships is a statewide concern); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620 
at *8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1994) (stating “marriage is the essence of [the d]efendant’s 
argument”). 
 181. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.54 subd. 5 (2002) (legislating in the area of 
domestic relations, including benefits considered as income concerning the 
disbursement of marital property upon dissolution of marriage). 
 182. See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. 
 183. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971). 
 184. Id. at 315, 191 N.W.2d at 187; Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of 
the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and 
Purposeful Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407, 412 (1998) (noting 
“[w]hile challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage may have seemed 
ripe . . . Baker was clearly a case before its time.”). 
 185. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2002). 
 186. See MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2002).  “On May 16, 1997, the [DOMA] 
legislation easily passed 54-12 in the Senate and 112 to 19 in the House.”  Betlach, 
supra note 184, at 427.  The date is potentially significant because Minnesota did 
not have a DOMA statute when Lilly was decided in 1995.  Thus, an even stronger 
public policy favoring marriage exists in Minnesota than when Lilly was decided. 
 187. MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002). 
 188. See Act of Apr. 10, 2003, ch. 11, 2003 Minn. Laws S.F. No. 293, § 1 subd. 
19(a) available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/slaws/2003/c011.html (last 
visited March 6, 2004) (“Any provision of a collective bargaining agreement or 
compensation plan in this section that provides a benefit based on a person’s 
status as a domestic partner of a state employee is not ratified and must not be 
implemented.”). “State worker contracts were ratified by the Legislature [during 
the 2003 legislative session], but they were missing a provision that provides health 
benefits for same-sex domestic partners.  Former Gov. Jesse Ventura’s 
administration included the offering in most union contracts for 2002-03.”  
Associated Press Newswires, How Some Major Issues Are Faring in the 2003 Legislative 
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indicate that the state has clearly chosen to occupy the field of 
marriage policy. 
Reasonable minds could potentially differ on whether 
domestic partner benefits in themselves infringe upon state 
marriage policy.  It becomes more difficult to argue that 
Minneapolis does not in any way seek to influence, augment, or 
protest state marriage policy when the ordinance itself purports to 
do as much.  One of the stated purposes of the ordinance is to 
recognize relationships between adult partners “who are 
committed to each other to the same extent as married persons are to 
each other.”189  The ordinance also mandates that contractor 
employee benefits be provided to domestic partners if these 
benefits are provided “in any manner contingent upon the 
existence of a marital relationship.”190  Assessing the language of a 
domestic partner ordinance becomes potentially critical given that 
the Georgia Supreme Court, the only other court to rule on state 
preemption of municipal domestic partner benefits twice, upheld 
Atlanta’s domestic partner ordinance the second time only because 
Atlanta removed any language relating to marriage.191  Unlike 
Atlanta, Minneapolis made no attempt to draw a distinction 
between its domestic partner benefits law and state marriage 
policy.192  The City Council could have crafted words that do not 
indicate a clear intent to enter the realm of marriage policy in 
drafting its domestic partner ordinance, but it chose not to do so.193  
In crafting its ordinance, Minneapolis plainly disregarded Lilly. 
In addition to state family policy, Minneapolis’ ordinance has 
the potential to intrude upon the realm of state anti-discrimination 
policy, thereby triggering preemption.  The Lilly court ruled that 
 
Session, May 20, 2003, 05/20/03 APWIRES 18:52:00, WL ALLNEWSPLUS Library. 
 189. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) 
(2003) (emphasis added).  The full passage in pertinent part reads: 
The City of Minneapolis recognizes that a nationwide debate has 
advanced an expanded concept of familial relationship beyond 
traditional, marital relationships.  This expanded concept includes 
relationships between two (2) non-married, adult partners who are 
committed to one another to the same extent as married persons are 
to each other, except for the traditional marital status and solemnities. 
 190. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
 191. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 192. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) 
(2003). 
 193. Id. 
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discrimination policy is a power of the state and is not to be altered 
by municipal legislation.194  The legislative intent of Minnesota’s 
Human Rights Act shows that by adding sexual orientation to its 
non-discrimination policies, the state had no intent of creating 
domestic partner benefits.195  Indeed, the statute itself expressly 
disclaims recognition of alternative lifestyles.196 It could be argued 
that Minneapolis did affect state discrimination policy in enacting 
domestic partner benefits legislation.  Yet, the wording of the 
ordinance again suggests that this is precisely what the City 
attempted to do.197  The ordinance states, “no contractor shall 
discriminate . . . in the provision of employee benefits.”198  Wording 
aside, logic dictates that if Minneapolis’ first attempt to legislate in 
the area of domestic partner benefits was preempted on the basis 
that the state occupies the field of anti-discrimination policy, then 
so does its city contractor ordinance; domestic partner benefits are 
equally related to anti-discrimination policy when provided by city 
contractors as compared to the city itself. 
Under a Lilly framework, Minneapolis’ ordinance conflicts 
with Minnesota statutes and is preempted by state public policy.  
Because the state already occupies the fields of marriage and anti-
discrimination policy, Minneapolis law must be in accord with state 
law in every reasonable respect.  At minimum, some discord exists 
between state and city law with regard to marriage and anti-
discrimination policy. 
C.   Reconsidering Lilly 
1.  Potential Arguments against Lilly 
As is apparent thus far, the wording of the Minneapolis 
ordinance offers the City little room to argue that the ordinance is 
not an attempt to legislate in the realm of state family and anti-
 
 194. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (noting that discrimination policy is a “statewide 
concern”); City of Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights v. Univ. of Minn., 356 
N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (same). 
 195. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 196. See MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002) (stating that the statute should not be 
“construed to authorize the recognition of or the right of marriage between 
persons of the same sex). 
 197. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) 
(2003). 
 198. See id. (emphasis added). 
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discrimination policies.199  If Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city 
contractor ordinance is to be upheld, the City will have to argue 
against Lilly.  Although it is always an uphill battle to argue against 
precedent, some grounds for questioning Lilly do exist. 
In order to challenge Lilly, Minneapolis must attempt to 
narrow the realm of state family policy to exclude domestic partner 
benefits by insisting that domestic partner benefits are not an 
attempt to infringe upon state policy concerning marriage and 
family.200  Some authority exists from other jurisdictions supporting 
such a claim.201  In the absence of state legislation directly 
concerning state benefits, the City could argue that the field of 
family policy triggering preemption by the state does not include 
benefits to non-marital partners.  To support such a proposition, 
the City could draw the distinction that “[m]arriage is generally a 
relationship between two individuals and the state, whereas, a 
domestic partner benefit plan is a relationship between two 
individuals and an employer or between two individuals and a 
municipality.”202  In addition, the City could point out that marriage 
still conveys a host of legal rights emanating from the state that 
domestic partnerships do not.203  The City could argue state family 
policies204 merely place an affirmative burden on city governments 
to support and encourage marriage.  This burden need not 
exclude providing certain rights to domestic partners.205 
Even if Minneapolis successfully argues its domestic partner 
ordinance is harmonious with state family law, the City must 
 
 199. See supra Part VI.B. 
 200. Cf. Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (holding that Minneapolis’ first domestic 
partner ordinance intrudes upon the definition of family relationships, which is a 
statewide concern). 
 201. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 202. Debbie Zielinski, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Why Not Offer Them to Same-
Sex Partners and Unmarried Opposite Sex Partners?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281, 296 (1999) 
(citing Demian, Comparing Legal Marriage/Ceremonial Marriage/Domestic Partner 
Benefits at http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-comp.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2003)). 
 203. See id. at 296-98.  Some of the rights married partners enjoy but domestic 
partners would not enjoy under a domestic partner benefits law include certain 
property rights, child custody, crime victim’s recovery, divorce protections, 
domestic violence intervention, exemption of property taxes upon a partner’s 
death, immunity from testifying, joint adoption and foster care, joint bankruptcy, 
medical decisions on behalf of a partner, and wrongful death benefits.  Id. 
 204. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text. 
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additionally discredit the analysis in Lilly that municipal anti-
discrimination policy related to domestic partners is a realm of 
policy normally occupied by the state.206  It does appear odd that 
Minneapolis has a Human Rights Commission,207 yet any policy 
regarding anti-discrimination benefits is subject to a high standard 
of judicial scrutiny.208  The Lilly court did not explain why the City 
had the “home rule” power to establish a city Human Rights 
Commission but lacked the “home rule” power to fully act in the 
area of discrimination policy.209 
Supposing that Minneapolis can undermine the Lilly rationale 
for strictly construing state law against the City,210 it still must 
demonstrate that a broader construction of state law would allow 
for domestic partner benefits.211  The dissent in Lilly provides the 
 
 206. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995), rev. denied (Mar. 29, 1995) (stating that the court disagreed with the city’s 
contention that its action was of local concern only and not in conflict with state 
law). 
 207. Minneapolis has a Human Rights Commission established by the City 
Council.  See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 141, § 141.40 
(2003). The Commission’s mandate is to: 
Seek to prevent and eliminate bias and discrimination because of race, 
color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, affectional preference, 
disability, age, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, or 
familial status by means of education, persuasion, conciliation and 
enforcement, mediation and the impartial resolution and adjudication 
of disputes, and utilize all the powers at its disposal to carry into 
execution the provisions of this title. 
MINNEAPOLIS CODE § 141.40(a) (emphasis added).  Minneapolis also has other 
declarations of state anti-discrimination policy; see MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139 §§ 139.10 et seq. (2003).  The ordinance reads, in 
pertinent part: 
It is the public policy of the City of Minneapolis and the purpose of 
this title . . . [t]o prevent and prohibit all discriminatory practice based 
on race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, including 
sexual harassment, affectional preference, disability, age, marital status, 
or status with regard to public assistance with respect to employment, 
labor union membership, housing accommodations, property rights, 
education, public accommodations or public services. 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 139, § 139.10(b)(2) (2003). 
 208. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111 (noting that when local legislation involves a 
statewide problem, the court must apply the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
“directive to ‘narrowly construe’ the city’s power to act ‘unless the legislature has 
expressly provided otherwise.’ ”) (citing Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 
120 (Minn. 1984)). 
 209. Barron, supra note 70, at 2356 n.411. 
 210. See Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 111. 
 211. Cf. id. (“If a matter presents a statewide problem, the implied necessary 
powers of a municipality to regulate are narrowly construed . . .”).  It is not clear 
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most obvious grounds for interpreting Minnesota statutes to allow 
for domestic partner benefits legislation.212  The crux of the dissent 
is that in the absence of express statutory prohibition of a city 
ordinance, the ordinance should be upheld.213  The dissent lists 
statutes that do in fact expressly limit city power to show that the 
legislature can act directly when it seeks to prevent city action on a 
particular matter.214  Thus, the City could argue that in the absence 
of an express statutory prohibition against cities mandating 
domestic partner benefits be provided to their contractors, no 
conflict with state law exists. 
2.  Arguments for Preserving Lilly 
Minneapolis’ potential arguments that family and 
discrimination policies do not occupy the realm of domestic 
partner benefits ultimately fall short.  While state family policy 
never expressly excludes domestic partner benefits, Minnesota 
statutes make it clear that the state legislature has no desire to 
endorse or promote familial relationships outside of traditional 
marriage.215  Further, numerous scholars, including those who 
support domestic partner benefits legislation, have recognized the 
essential nexus between domestic partner benefits and state family 
or marriage policy.216 
 
what a non-narrow (broad) construction of a state statute would be, but it would 
doubtless be more deferential in allowing for cities to enact ordinances that do 
not directly conflict with state statutes. 
 212. Lilly, 527 N.W.2d at 113-16 (Schumacher, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 114 (noting “[i]t is well-settled that a home rule city cannot pass 
legislation that ‘permits what [a] statute forbids’ . . . [but t]here is no language in 
Minn. Stat. § 471.61 that forbids a home rule charter city from expanding the list 
of employee healthcare benefits.”) (citation omitted). 
 214. Id.  For example, Judge Schumacher cited Minnesota Statutes section 
471.633 (1992), which provided that the ‘“legislature preempts all authority of a 
home rule charter’ city to regulate firearms except as expressly provided by that 
statute.”  Id. 
 215. See MINN. STAT. § 363.021 (2002). 
 216. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND 
THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS, 115-18 (2002) (observing that movements toward 
recognizing different forms of marriage and family throughout Europe and North 
America have empirically moved in gradual, parallel, and consistent increments); 
Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the 
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF 
NATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 441 (Robert Wintemute & 
Mads Andenas eds., 2001) (noting that the groundwork for same-sex marriage in 
the Netherlands was laid out by other, more incremental legal changes, and how 
each legal step leads closer to same-sex marriage); Frances N. Balonwu, Rights and 
Entitlement of Same-Sex Cohabitants: Should Gays and Lesbians Have a Right to Their 
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The argument that discrimination is not a statewide problem 
also runs into trouble because the state has long entered and 
occupied the realm of employment discrimination policy.217  
Apparently, even the drafters of the ordinance establishing the City 
Commission on Human Rights recognized that the commission is 
ultimately subordinate to state law.218  The ordinance notes that the 
 
Partners’ Employment Benefits?, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 483, 498 (1998) (noting 
“[o]ne of the goals of the gay and lesbian community is to expand the meaning of 
‘family’ so that same-sex couples are legally protected”) (citing Libby Post, The 
Question of Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting on Redefined Society, 19 FORDHAM 
URBAN L.J. 747, 748 (1992)); Shoshana Bricklin, Legislative Approaches to Support 
Family Diversity, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 379, 380 (1998) (characterizing 
Philadelphia’s Domestic Partnership Bill as part of “the campaign for family 
diversity rights”); M.R. Carrillo-Heian, Domestic Partnership in California: Is It a Step 
Toward Marriage?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 475, 488, 492 (2000) (arguing that 
domestic partnerships, while inferior to same-sex marriage, are a plausible 
alternative for states who wish to confer the legal benefits of marriage without 
actually calling it “marriage”); Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining 
Traditional Family Benefits through Litigation, Legislation, and Collective Bargaining, 15 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 93, 131 (2000) (linking a proposed Madison domestic partner 
ordinance with “[t]he fight to obtain legislative extension of alternative family 
benefits”); Development in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family: Inching Down the 
Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States 
and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004, 2009 (2003) (observing that “[t]he path of 
reform has been remarkably consistent in each of the European countries that 
have legalized same-sex partnerships, leading one scholar to label it a ‘necessary 
process,’ in which each step in the expansion of civil rights is critical to enabling 
the next) (citations omitted); James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict 
Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 L. & SEXUALITY 649, 649 (1998) (noting 
that “[domestic] partnerships are often viewed as . . . a way of according economic 
and legal equality to gay and lesbian couples while withholding the magic 
symbolism of ‘marriage’ ”); Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits: 
Redefining Family in the Work Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 49, 49 (1994) (noting 
that the domestic partnership movement sprang up as a result of the fact that 
“lesbians and gay men are not allowed to marry”); Libby Post, The Question of 
Family: Lesbians and Gay Men Reflecting a Redefined Society, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 747, 
748 (stating that “the goal of the lesbian and gay community today [in pushing for 
domestic partnership legislation] is to expand the meaning of ‘family’ ”).  Cf. 
Charles R.P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 363, 365 (1998) (drawing a distinction between 
domestic partnership legislation and the same-sex marriage movement, and 
arguing domestic partnerships are preferable as an alternative, rather than 
movement toward, same-sex marriage).  Recall that the Minneapolis ordinance 
also states its purpose is to redefine familial relationships.  See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a). 
 217. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (2002) (prohibiting employment discrimination 
on the basis of “race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, 
status with regard to public assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age”). 
 218. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 7, ch. 141, § 141.90 
(2003) (stating that “No matter shall be heard . . . pursuant to the provisions of 
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Commissioner cannot act on matters “previously considered by the 
State of Minnesota Commissioner of Human Rights.”219  The mere 
fact that Minnesota has a Board of Human Rights suggests the 
legislature thought discrimination was a statewide, rather than 
purely local, problem.220  Undermining the Lilly preemption 
rationale would also undermine the decision in City of Minneapolis 
Commission on Civil Rights v. University of Minnesota,221 which in the 
broadest of terms noted, “[c]ivil rights problems are not confined 
to a metropolitan area.  They can fairly be stated to be a statewide 
problem.  [Minnesota law], then, requires a narrow construction of 
Minneapolis’ powers to regulate civil rights.”222 
Supposing Minneapolis can convince a court that familial and 
anti-discrimination policies are not realms occupied by the state, 
even a broader construction of state law probably results in a 
conflict between domestic partner benefits ordinances and state 
policy.  Even broadly construed, Minnesota statutes give cities only 
the express power to provide insurance benefits to their own 
employees.223  Further, the Lilly court notes in its discussion of 
section 471.61 of Minnesota Statutes that the term “dependents” is 
exclusively defined as spouses and minor unmarried children 
younger than eighteen and dependent students younger than 25.224  
If a municipality had inherent powers, then perhaps the City could 
require benefits to be provided to contractors and make new 
categories of beneficiaries like domestic partners.  However, a city 
has no powers save those expressly conferred by statute.225 
VII. NEW ISSUES RAISED BY THE MINNEAPOLIS ORDINANCE: 
DOES THE ORDINANCE CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW, 
OR IS IT PREEMPTED BY STATE CONTRACTING POLICY? 
Minneapolis’ domestic partner-city contractor ordinance raises 
new issues beyond those raised by Lilly.  These issues relate to the 
 
this title when the matter has been previously considered by the State of 
Minnesota . . . .”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. 356 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 222. Id. at 843 (referring to Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 120 
(Minn. 1984)). 
 223. See MINN. STAT. § 471.61 subd. 1 (2002). 
 224. See Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 225. Welsh, 355 N.W.2d at 120. 
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authority that a “home rule” city has to enact legislation affecting 
city contractors rather than the City’s own employees.  The City will 
want to point out that municipalities are generally given discretion 
in matters of contracting.226  Those opposed to the ordinance will 
want to highlight potential conflicts between Minnesota state 
contracting policy and the ordinance as well as argue that the state 
already occupies the field of mandatory anti-discrimination clauses 
in city contracts. 
Minneapolis’ domestic partner benefits legislation risks 
conflict with state law regarding expenditures for state contracts.  
According to Minnesota administrative rules, “[u]nless otherwise 
provided for by law, awards for all acquisitions, except building and 
construction contracts, must be based on best value.”227  Yet, 
requiring all major contractors with the city to provide domestic 
partner benefits has the potential to cost taxpayers across the state 
extra money because Minneapolis derives a significant portion of 
its budget from the state.228  The City apparently attempts to avoid 
 
 226. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 227. 
 227. MINN. R. 1230.0800 (2003), available at http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us 
/arule/1230/0800.html (last visited March 6, 2004).  Municipal legislation that 
deals with statewide concerns must fully comply with “state public policy as 
disclosed in the general law,” which includes administrative rules.  See Lilly v. City 
of Minneapolis, 1994 WL 315620, at *3 (conclusion of law no. 9) (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
June 3, 1994) (citing State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 
526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958)). 
 The term “best value” is somewhat ambiguous on its face, so some historical 
explanation may be helpful.  Rule 1230.0800, recently updated, previously read, 
“[a]ward of contracts shall be made in conformity with Minnesota Statutes, section 
16B.09 and with no material variance from the terms and conditions of the bid 
invitation.”  MINN. R. 1230.0800 (2002).  Thus, it is necessary to refer back to 
Minnesota statutes for greater clarity.  Minnesota statutes previously read: 
All state contracts and purchases made by or under the supervision of 
the commissioner or an agency for which competitive bids are required 
must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into consideration 
conformity with the specifications, terms of delivery, the purpose for 
which the contract or purchase is intended, the status and capability of 
the vendor, and other considerations imposed in the call for bids. 
MINN. STAT. § 16B.09 (1998), repealed by Minn. Laws, ch. 386, art. 1, § 35 (1998).  
(emphasis added).  Thus, “best value” can best be interpreted to mean lowest 
price put forth by a lawful bidder. 
 The Commissioner of Administration has authority to make or retain rules 
related to state contracting in order to best articulate and effectuate state statutes.  
The existing statute gives the commissioner the power to “supervise, control, 
review, and approve all state contracts and purchasing.”  MINN. STAT. § 16B.04 
subd. 2(1) (2002). 
 228. State government funds accounted for roughly thirteen percent of 
Minneapolis’ $1.179 billion budget in 2003. City of Minneapolis FY 2003 Budget, 
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the appearance of spending extra money on contracts by asserting 
that domestic partner benefits improve the quality and value of the 
goods provided to the city.229  The fact remains, however, that 
unless the City grants a special exception, it will end up rejecting 
lower bids from equally skilled and capable contractors who do not 
offer domestic partner benefits in favor of contractors who do.230 
Minneapolis has ample ground to contend that its ordinance 
does not conflict with Minnesota administrative law, however.  The 
City will want to first argue that Rule 1230.0800 does not conflict 
with its own contracting practices as a city.  In so doing, the City will 
want to distinguish Minnesota’s contracting rule from Minnesota 
statutes, which historically applied to state contracts and purchases 
as opposed to municipal ones.231  Thus, the state law would apply to 
save money for state contracts, but not necessarily city ones.232  The 
City could additionally point out that municipalities are generally 
given broad leeway in awarding city contracts so long as there is no 
contradiction with state law.233  The City could also argue that those 
who bid for contracts yet do not offer domestic partner benefits are 
not lawful bidders within the meaning of Rule 1230.0800 because 
such bidders do not conform to city requirements.234  The City 
could argue that its purpose in awarding contracts is to achieve the 
highest quality of goods and services possible, and that domestic 
partners must be given benefits to achieve “best value” for the 
state.235 
In addition to the preceding arguments, the City by analogy 
can point to its other regulatory ordinances in place for contractors 
who bid for city contracts that are lawful regardless of their 
immediate economic impact to the state.  These regulations 
 
Financial Overview, at 17, available at http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/city-
budget/2003adopted/TAB3-FinancialOverview.pdf (last visited March 6, 2004). 
 229. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) 
(2003). 
 230. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(d) 
(2003). 
 231. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Wichern, supra note 84, at 227. 
 234. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 235. The Minneapolis ordinance states: “Requiring contractors to provide to 
employees with domestic partners benefits equal to those provided to employees 
who are married will require contractors to maintain a competitive advantage in 
recruiting and retaining the highest quality work force, thereby improving the 
quality of goods and services that the city receives.” MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 18, § 18.200(a) (2003). 
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include: a fair wage requirement236 (including a submission of 
statements and payroll records),237 a requirement that no 
contractor charge its employees fees for obtaining employment,238 
and a requirement that wages and materials be paid for before the 
contractor takes its profits.239  Thus, the city could argue that these 
are examples that demonstrate it is within its authority to enact 
regulations vis-à-vis city contractors. 
The fact that Minneapolis has other regulations that 
potentially raise the price on city contracts only has legal 
significance, however, if it can be shown that these requirements go 
beyond the bounds of state law.240  In other words, such an 
argument carries legal weight only if the city demonstrates that 
cities have certain intrinsic powers to enact regulations related to 
city contracts independent of state public policy in the first place.241  
It is here that the City’s argument may fall short.  The state has 
similar statutes requiring state workers to be paid a fair wage, for 
example.242  Minnesota law even expressly authorizes such 
municipal labor standards.243  Therefore, the City’s other labor 
 
 236. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.220 (2003) 
(stating “all contracts . . . to which the city is a party . . . shall contain a provision 
stating that all federal labor standards and prevailing wage provisions applicable to 
federal contracts . . . are applicable to this contract . . . and all contractors and 
subcontractors shall fully comply with such provisions regardless of any contractual 
relationship which may be alleged to exist between the contractor or 
subcontractor and his employees.”). 
 237. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.220 (2003). 
 238. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.60 (2003) 
(stating “[n]o person shall be employed on any public work done by contract for 
the city through the agency . . . which charges the employee a fee for securing 
such employment . . . .”). 
 239. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 2, ch. 24, § 24.200 (2003) 
(stating city contracts “shall contain a special provision for the payment of the 
laborers, employees and those furnishing materials for such work . . . out of the 
amount due said contractors from the city, before any part is paid to said 
contractors”). 
 240. See, e.g., State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 
528, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958) (“The adoption of any [city] charter provision 
contrary to the public policy of the state, as disclosed by general laws or its penal 
code, is . . . forbidden.”). 
 241. See id. 
 242. See MINN. STAT. § 177.41 (2002) (requiring that highway workers be paid 
“wages of laborers, workers, and mechanics . . . comparable to wages paid for 
similar work in the community as a whole”); see also MINN. STAT. § 177.43 subd. 
1(2) (2002) (“a laborer or mechanic may not be paid a lesser rate of wages than 
the prevailing wage rate”). 
 243. See MINN. STAT. § 471.345 subd. 7 (2002). 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any municipality 
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standards tend to only buttress existing state public policy, leaving 
the City as a political subdivision of, rather than an autonomous 
agent from, the state.244 
In addition to conflicting with state contracting law, the 
ordinance may more directly conflict with, or be preempted by, 
existing Minnesota law regarding anti-discrimination policy for 
municipal contracts.  In prescribing the anti-discrimination 
requirements for all state and municipal contracts, the state’s 
criterion does not include domestic partner benefits, or even 
sexual orientation: 
Every contract for or on behalf of the state of Minnesota, 
or any county, city . . . or any other district in the state, for 
materials, supplies, or construction shall contain 
provisions by which the contractor agrees . . . [t]hat, in 
the hiring of common or skilled labor for the 
performance of any work under any contract, or any 
subcontract, no contractor, material supplier, or vendor, 
shall, by reason of race, creed, or color, discriminate 
against the person or persons who are . . . qualified and 
available to perform the work to which the employment 
relates.245 
The statute may conflict with the Minneapolis ordinance.  The 
canon of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius,246 if used to 
construe the statute, would indicate an intent by the legislature to 
exclude the possibility that cities could add anti-discrimination 
categories other than race, creed, or color.247  Preemption is a 
 
from adopting rules, regulations, or ordinances which establish the 
prevailing wage rate as defined in section 177.42, as a minimum 
standard for wages and which establish the hours and working 
conditions prevailing for the largest number of workers engaged in the 
same class of labor within the area as a minimum standard for a 
contractor’s employees which must be agreed to by any contractor 
before the contractor may be awarded any contract for the furnishing 
of any labor, material, supplies, or service. 
Id. 
 244. This is not to say that every city ordinance must match verbatim the terms 
of a comparable state statute.  However, when presented with a statewide problem 
that the state has attempted to address, a Minnesota city cannot act in 
contravention to the state.  See Lowell, 252 Minn. at 528, 91 N.W.2d at 83. 
 245. MINN. STAT. § 181.59 (2002). 
 246. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “that to express or include one 
thing implies the exclusion of the other.”  BLACK’S, supra note 44, at 602. 
 247. Minnesota courts have applied the expressio unius construction as an aid in 
interpreting legislative intent.  See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84, 
88-89, 67 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1955). 
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possibility as well.  The statute potentially indicates the state 
intended to occupy the field of mandatory anti-discrimination 
provisions in state and city contracts, thus constituting preemption.  
Given that the sweeping language of the statute applies to both 
state and city governments, both conflict and preemption 
arguments appear strong. 
Minneapolis’ ordinance raises novel issues related to a city’s 
authority to enact contracting policy.  The ordinance is probably 
ultra vires because it conflicts with state contracting law and is 
preempted because the state ostensibly has occupied the field of 
law mandating anti-discrimination provisions in state and city 
contracts. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Minneapolis’ domestic partner ordinance, while a clever 
attempt to avoid the Lilly decision, is an exercise beyond the City’s 
“home rule” authority.  The ordinance either conflicts with state 
law or is preempted by state public policies regarding municipal 
employee benefits, marriage, anti-discrimination,248 and 
contracting.249  These factors mean that Minneapolis’ domestic 
partner ordinance is ultra vires.250 
This is not to say that Minnesota cities should not have the 
leeway to act in matters of primarily local importance.  The issue of 
domestic partner benefits is much broader than a city issue, 
however.251  Given that Minnesota’s interpretation of “home rule” 
authority seeks to delineate between state and local functions,252 
distinctions between statewide and local issues should be made 
where possible to preserve the integrity of “home rule” authority. 
Domestic partner benefits are an emerging and important 
issue best addressed at the state level.  The Lilly should stay in the 
pond, lest the frog of federalism253 have one less place to rest. 
 
 248. See supra Part V.B. 
 249. See supra Part VI. 
 250. See supra Parts V-VI.  Of course, a court decision would not be necessary if 
the Minnesota legislature intervened by passing a statute expressly prohibiting 
municipalities from mandating that contractors provide domestic partner benefits.  
See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra Part II.C and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra Part III.C and accompanying text. 
 253. I use federalism in this context to refer to the balance of power between 
the state and localities as articulated by the courts in accordance with Minnesota’s 
“home rule” authority laws, discussed in Part III, supra. 
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